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Treehoppers (Tylopelta gibbera) 
are small sap-feeding insects that 
live on plant stems. Treehoppers 
communicate by vibrations traveling 
along the stem, branches and leaves 
of their host plant. Male treehoppers 
produce sex- and species-specific 
‘whine/pulse’ patterns, which, under 
suitable conditions, elicit low frequency 
‘drone’ responses from females. Upon 
sensing her reply, the male begins 
searching for the stationary female, 
crawling up stems and branches, 
continuing to signal, and waiting for 
the female’s response. When all goes 
well, the male eventually locates the 
female and they mate. However, if 
another male is present on the plant, 
he too signals, and a race begins. The 
female responds to both males, and 
mates with the first one that arrives. In 
such situations, competing males often 
produce a second ‘masking’ signal, 
simultaneous with the rival’s whine/
pulse. This suppresses the female’s 
response, impeding the masked male’s 
search.
Most scientists would be happy to 
concede that male treehopper whine/
pulses and female drones are ‘signals’ 
conveying ‘information’ about the 
presence and location of a conspecific, 
and that the male and female influence 
each other via these signals, in a 
way that is, on average, beneficial to 
both. But what of the second male’s 
jamming signal? Clearly it influences 
the female (presumably to the benefit 
of the masker and detriment of the 
maskee). But does it carry information? 
Is it a ‘signal’ at all? What of the 
related thornhopper (Figure ), which 
looks remarkably like a thorn — is this 
disguise a ‘signal’ designed to mislead 
Book review bird predators into thinking ‘just a thorn there’? These are the sorts of questions 
raised in this stimulating collection of 
essays on theoretical issues in animal 
communication, written by a set of 
prominent biologists and philosophers.
Superficially, the core debate seems 
simple. ‘Informationists’ seek to ground 
discussions of animal communication 
in information theory. Following Claude 
Shannon [], the ‘information’ in animal 
signals — whether visual, auditory, 
tactile or olfactory — can be understood 
and measured quantitatively, in the 
common coin of bits. ‘Influentialists’, 
on the other hand, argue that animal 
communication should be grounded 
in terms of the influence that signalers 
have on receivers, and reject 
‘information’ as a misleading metaphor. 
Influentialists stress an evolutionary 
framework, wherein the adaptive 
function of signals is successful 
manipulation of receivers. 
Beneath this apparent simplicity lurk 
a number of surprisingly problematic 
issues that are very nicely brought 
out and explored in this book. While 
no biologist disputes the importance 
of an evolutionary perspective, 
most see information as a core 
concept in understanding animal 
communication. The most vehement 
influentialists suggest that ‘information’ 
is such an ambiguous, metaphoric 
construct, inevitably bearing such 
a host of misleading connotations 
from linguistics, that the term should 
simply be banned from biological 
discussions. As their paradigmatic 
example, primatologists Drew Rendall 
and Michael Owren use the well 
known example of vervet monkey 
alarm calls to illustrate the dangers of 
linguistic metaphors. Vervets produce 
acoustically distinct alarm calls when 
spotting different predators (including 
leopards, eagles and snakes), and 
playbacks of these calls, in the absence 
of predators, still elicit the appropriate 
anti-predator responses in listening 
vervets. This classic finding in animal 
communication has often been seen as 
a primitive form of ‘animal language’, 
with the alarm calls amounting to 
simple meaningful utterances: “Eagle!”, 
“Snake!”, “Leopard!”
But, as vervet experts Dorothy 
Cheney and Robert Seyfarth have 
tirelessly pointed out, this analogy 
to language is overly glib. They cite 
considerable evidence that indicates 
fundamental differences between 
monkey calls and human words. In particular, human language involves 
a cognitive parity between speakers 
and listeners, where each knows the 
meaning of a word, and knows that 
the other knows this. For primates, 
in contrast, it seems that most of 
the interpretive work is done by 
listeners alone, who use their real-
world knowledge of individuals, 
predators and the current situation to 
make astute inferences about what 
a call might indicate. The caller, on 
the other hand, seems to have little 
understanding of the effects its call 
might have. Primates often call without 
any intent to inform listeners, or even 
to provide them with novel information. 
For example, even once an entire 
vervet troop has seen the predator and 
is safely up a tree, they continue to 
call. Such research demonstrates that 
the assumption of parity that comes to 
us naturally, as language users, fails to 
apply to other primates, as Cheney and 
Seyfarth have consistently reminded 
their readers [2].
Of course, specialists in biology 
are well aware of the dangers of 
importing the connotations of 
terms like ‘information’, ‘meaning’, 
‘honesty’, ‘cheating’ and the like into 
scholarly discourse, partly due to 
the heated discussions surrounding 
such phenomena as ‘ant slavery’ 
or ‘rape by ducks’. By my reading, 
the pro-information authors in this 
volume are consistently clear that 
they use the term ‘information’ in a 
restricted technical sense borrowed 
from information theory. For clarity, 
I will denote this term as information 
hereafter, where it denotes the 
reduction in uncertainty occurring in 
a suitably equipped receiver upon 
reception of a signal. This probabilistic 
quantity can be quantified in terms 
of bits (binary digits), a measure so 
familiar in today’s digital world that 
it is easy to forget that Shannon 
introduced it in the engineering context 
of signal transmission []. Shannon 
and his colleagues were adamant that 
information is not the same thing as 
meaning or relevance, and Shannon 
deplored the tendency of many to 
conflate them and thus overstate the 
reach of information theory [3]. 
information is in the eye of the 
beholder — one man’s signal is 
another man’s noise — and in its 
technical sense sheds most linguistic 
connotations attached to the term (e.g. 
that information in a signal implies a 
conscious intent to ‘inform’ on the part 
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Figure . Treehoppers.
Membracid insects like these male thorn bugs, Umbonia crassicornis, communicate through 
substrate-borne vibrations, and often are highly camouflaged. Both vibrational communica-
tion and camouflage provide problematic “edge cases’’ for theories of animal communication 
discussed and analyzed in this volume. (Photo: Kathy C. Malone.)of the signaler). Whether information 
is relevant to a receiver depends on 
context, not just information content: a 
female red deer shows little response 
to a stag’s roar until she is ovulating, 
but during this brief period exhibits 
a phonotactic response to roars [4]. 
Nonetheless, non-estrous females 
are almost certainly sensitive to the 
information that roars indicate the 
presence of stags, even if they show no 
reaction. Most biologists understand 
that use of information demands 
care, and respect for its restricted, 
technical meaning [5]. By and large, the 
informationists in this volume live up to 
this challenge, clearly stating that they 
are discussing information rather than 
language, meaning, representation, 
relevance or other more loaded and 
ambiguous terms. 
Adopting extreme influentialism 
would neglect a long tradition of using 
information to quantify core issues in 
animal communication. For example, 
Haldane and Spurway calculated 
that the dance of a forager honeybee 
contains, in principle, about 5 bits 
of information concerning flower 
location, of which only half are used 
effectively by signal recipients. The 
chapters by Colin Allen and Michael 
Lachmann also provide nice examples 
of the value of this technical 
approach. In the neighboring 
discipline of neuroscience, 
information theory has come to play 
a central role [6]. In some systems, 
like fly vision, we can now measure 
the metabolic cost of information 
at a cellular level, in terms of ATP 
molecules per bit [7]. These and many 
other cases belie the strong claim in 
the chapter by Rendall and Owren 
that “whether they know it or not, 
researchers relying on information … 
are implicitly positing that signals are 
representational in nature.” While they 
are correct to warn of the dangers 
of unconscious implications when 
using words — the price of metaphor 
is eternal vigilance — they are wrong 
to think that clarity can be obtained 
by banning words. information is 
more than a metaphor, and outside 
of primatology, there seems to be 
little confusion about whether and 
when the term is being used in its 
useful technical sense. Indeed, such 
usage helps build needed bridges to 
other disciplines like neuroscience, 
ecology, engineering and physics. 
Posing ‘influence’ and ‘information’ 
as opposed dichotomous concepts, as the extreme influentialists do, 
creates a false dichotomy. Thus, for 
understanding animal communication, 
information is not the problem, it is 
part of the cure.
But this debate is only the first (and 
indeed the easiest) of the problems 
tackled in this volume — the more 
difficult issues concern the question 
of how to properly define a ‘signal’ 
or indeed ‘communication’ in animal 
communication research. Many 
attempts to do so rely on evolutionary, 
adaptive logic: we should call 
something a ‘signal’ only when, on 
average over evolutionary time it 
produces effects that are beneficial 
to the signaler [8]. This ultimate 
evolutionary perspective is adopted 
by many in the Stegmann volume. 
But Haven Wiley’s chapter offers a 
proximate, mechanistic definition: 
“a signal is any pattern of energy or 
matter that evokes a response without 
providing all of the power for that 
response”. This very broad definition 
has the virtue of being directly testable, 
and of allowing for learned signals to be 
included. If after some time in France 
one learns that saying (or hearing) “il pleut” signifies “it’s raining”, this is just 
as surely a signal as is my (unlearned) 
laughter or crying. But the phrase itself 
has no biologically adaptive history. For 
learned animal signals, like birdsong, 
this is an important issue to keep 
in mind. However, Wiley’s definition 
seems overly broad. It would make the 
fly’s movement or sounds a ‘signal’ to 
an insectivorous predator, and would 
include signals generated by inanimate 
sources. Lightning, smoke, or the crack 
of a falling tree, which most biologists 
or psychologists would term ‘stimuli’, 
would all be ‘signals’ by Wiley’s 
proximate definition. 
And what of the treehopper’s 
jamming signal, which functions to 
deter a response by females, and 
hinder localization by males (discussed 
in the Horisk & Cocroft chapter)? For 
this to be termed a signal, a rather 
broad definition of ‘response’ would 
be needed, one including ‘negative’ 
responses. Similarly, for the thorn bug, 
we might agree that the camouflage 
bears the misleading information “there 
is a thorn here”, thus constituting a 
(deceptive) signal by Wiley’s definition 
(the hungry bird concludes, wrongly, 
Current Biology Vol 24 No 
R0
Zhenbiao Yang 
Zhenbiao Yang grew up in a fishing 
village on the Southeast coast of China, 
and left his hometown for the first 
time at the age of 17 when he went 
to attend the South China College of 
Tropical Crops, Hainan Island, where 
he majored in crop pest management. 
He was awarded a fellowship to pursue 
graduate studies in the United States, 
but was initially denied this precious 
opportunity due to the disapproval 
of his interest in biochemistry by a 
university administrator. He eventually 
managed to come to the States and 
obtained MS and PhD degrees in plant 
pathology at Iowa State University and 
Virginia Tech, respectively. He gained 
postdoctoral training in plant signaling 
at the University of Maryland at College 
Park, where he identified Rho GTPases 
from plants, termed ROPs. He became 
an assistant professor at Ohio State 
University in 1994. There, Zhenbiao 
established two systems to investigate 
signaling mechanisms for pollen tip 
growth and cell–cell coordination 
of cell morphogenesis (pavement 
cells). He moved to the University of 
California at Riverside in 1999 and 
was promoted to full professor in 
2003. His research on pollen tubes has 
uncovered a ROP GTPase-based self-
organizing mechanism that controls 
rapid tip growth. His recent work in 
the pavement cell system has led to 
the discovery of a new auxin signaling 
mechanism that involves a cell surface 
auxin perception and that is distinct 
from the well-established nuclear auxin 
perception signaling system. 
What inspired you to become a 
scientist? My inspiration to search for 
answers to the unknown in science 
came from the popular science books 
that I read as a child. Books were hard 
to find in the countryside of China 
when I was a child, but I was lucky to 
borrow a popular science series for 
children, entitled 100,000 WHYs from 
my neighbor. I was glued to these 
books and finished reading them in one 
day. I was captivated by what nature 
presents and how scientists discover 
the underlying principles for natural 
occurrences. From then on, I dreamt 
of exploring the mysteries behind the 
fascinating nature that surrounds us 
Q & Athat the retinal image contains a thorn). But is this ‘communication’? Among 
influentialists, there is ongoing debate 
about whether attention should focus 
mainly on signalers or receivers. The 
correct answer is probably “both” [9]. 
The chapters in this volume reveal little 
consensus regarding these, and many 
other, interesting questions.
Despite numerous virtues, Wiley’s 
proximate definition of ‘signal’ 
would seem inadequate to many 
researchers interested in the evolution 
of communication. A prominent issue in 
this subfield is the question of ‘honesty’ 
in signals: under what conditions do 
signals provide perceivers with accurate 
information about the signaler, or 
the world? Evolutionary interests of 
signalers and receivers may often be 
different, leading to a constant selection 
for exaggeration and “dishonest” 
signaling (in this context, these terms 
carry no connotation of conscious 
deception). When signalers are, on 
average, deceptive, this should select 
for perceivers who ignore them [0], 
leading some to claim that only signals 
whose honesty is underwritten by a 
large ‘handicap’ cost to the signaler can 
be stable over evolutionary time []. 
But this claim is now known to be overly 
broad, since honesty without handicaps 
can exist either when the interests of 
signaler and receiver roughly coincide, 
or if signal accuracy is underwritten by 
physical constraints (e.g. if only large 
animals can produce low-frequency 
resonances [2]). Such theoretical 
discussions require terminology that 
goes beyond proximate mechanisms, 
framing signaling as an adaptation in 
the strict Darwinian sense.
This proximate versus ultimate 
debate is another false dichotomy, 
and the pluralistic perspective laid out 
by Tinbergen [3] provides the best 
way forward. Tinbergen emphasized 
that there is no conflict between 
ultimate and proximate explanations 
in biology, and that full understanding 
requires biologists to seek answers 
to both types of questions. In favor 
of mechanism, it is easier to observe 
a perceiver’s response to a signal 
than to rigorously determine if a 
particular signal is an adaptation: 
adaptation is an ‘onerous concept’ 
to be invoked only after plausible 
alternatives have been ruled out [4]. 
Nonetheless, a rich understanding of 
animal communication requires us to 
develop and test adaptive hypotheses 
about ultimate function. There is thus no real conflict between the diverse 
ultimate and proximate approaches to 
signaling adopted in this volume.
In summary, this is an extremely 
thought-provoking book that broadly 
captures the current state of play 
in these multiple ongoing debates. 
The diversity of opinions, each 
concisely expressed in relatively 
short chapters, is its key virtue. 
While many key issues are opened 
but not resolved, the book would 
provide an excellent focus for a 
discussion-oriented seminar on 
animal communication. For biologists 
studying animal communication, 
many chapters will be required 
reading, because they clarify that 
considerable work is still needed to 
place communication research on 
a firm theoretical foundation with 
clear consensus about terminology 
and practice. The volume raises 
and clarifies, without answering, 
numerous questions that any 
future theoretical framework must 
successfully address.
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